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abstract 
Responding to the invitation of this special issue of Childhood and Philosophy this paper 
considers the ethos of facilitation in philosophical enquiry with children, and the spatial-temporal 
order of the community of enquiry. Within the Philosophy with Children movement, there are 
differences of thinking and practice on ‘facilitation’ in communities of philosophical enquiry, and 
we suggest that these have profound implications for the political agency of children. Facilitation 
can be enacted as a chronological practice of progress and development that works against child, 
in terms of political agency. This paper theorises practices of facilitation grounded in philosophies 
of childhood that assume listening to child/ren as equals, as already able to philosophise, and 
against sameness. We explore the political and ethical implications of the radical posthumanist 
reconfiguration of the ‘zipped’ body in the light of including the disciplinary, imaginative and 
enabling energies of chronological time through the concept now/ness.  We shift from ethics to 
ethos, and from ‘zipped’ to ‘unzipped’ bodies, through the notion of affect to explore the temporal 
and spatial dimensions of facilitation in Philosophy with Children and children’s political agency. 
We re-turn to David McKee’s Not Now Bernard (1980), getting ‘inside the text’, and attending to 
the postponement of equality in Philosophy with Children. 
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bajo nuestras propias narices:  
la postergación de la igualdad política de los niños y el ahora 
  
resumen 
Respondiendo a la invitación de este número especial de Childhood and Philosophy este artículo 
pone en consideración el ethos de la facilitación en la investigación filosófica con niños y el orden 
espacio-temporal de la comunidad de investigación. Al interior del movimiento de Filosofía con 
Niños hay diferencias de pensamiento y práctica en relación a la “facilitación” en comunidades 
de investigación filosófica, y nosotros sugerimos que esas diferencias tienen profundas 
implicancias para con la agencia política de los y las niñas. La facilitación se puede representar 
como una práctica cronológica de progreso y desarrollo que opera en contra del niño, en términos 
de agencia política. Este artículo teoriza sobre prácticas de facilitación basadas en filosofías de la 
infancia que adoptan la postura de escuchar al/los niño/s como iguales, como ya capaces de 
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filosofar, y en contra de la uniformidad. Exploramos las implicancias éticas y políticas de la 
reconfiguración posthumanista radical del cuerpo ‘zippeado’ [comprimido] a la luz de incluir las 
energías disciplinarias, imaginativas y habilitadoras del tiempo cronológico a través del concepto 
del ahora. Nos movemos de la ética al ethos y de los cuerpos ‘zippeados’ [comprimidos] a los 
‘unzippeados’ [descomprimidos] a través de la noción de afecto para explorar las dimensiones 
temporales y espaciales de la facilitación en Filosofía con Niños y la agencia política de las y los 
niños. Re-tornamos al Not Now Bernard (1980) de David McKee, metiéndonos ‘adentro del texto’, 
y poniendo atención a la postergación de la igualdad en Filosofía con Niños. 
  
palabras clave: niño/a; igualdad; ahora; postergación; facilitación. 
 
bem debaixo de nossos narizes:  
o adiamento da igualdade política das crianças e o agora 
 
resumo 
Respondendo ao convite desta edição especial da Infância e Filosofia, este artigo considera o ethos 
da facilitação na investigação filosófica com crianças e a ordem espaço-temporal da comunidade 
de investigação. Dentro do movimento Filosofia com Crianças, existem diferenças de pensamento 
e prática sobre 'facilitação' em comunidades de investigação filosófica, e sugerimos que isso tem 
implicações profundas para a agência política das crianças. A facilitação pode ser executada como 
uma prática cronológica de progresso e desenvolvimento que funciona contra a criança, em 
termos de agência política. Este artigo teoriza práticas de facilitação alicerçadas em filosofias da 
infância que pressupõem ouvir a criança / criança como iguais, já capazes de filosofar e contra a 
mesmice. Exploramos as implicações políticas e éticas da reconfiguração pós-humanista radical 
do corpo "fechado" à luz da inclusão das energias disciplinares, imaginativas e capacitadoras do 
tempo cronológico por meio do conceito agora / ness. Mudamos da ética para o ethos, e de corpos 
"compactados" para "descompactados", por meio da noção de afeto para explorar as dimensões 
temporais e espaciais de facilitação em Filosofia com Crianças e a agência política infantil. 
Voltamos a Not Now Bernard de David McKee (1980), entrando "no texto" e tratando do 
adiamento da igualdade em Filosofia com Crianças. 
 
palavras-chave: criança; igualdade; agora; adiamento; facilitação. 
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right under our noses: the postponement of children’s political equality and the NOW 
 
introduction 
In this exploration of the ethos of communities of enquiry with children, we are 
inspired by the spirit and practice of Ann Margaret Sharp’s scholarship and activism, and 
appreciate the publication of a rich edited collection of her work and responses to it 
(2018)3. Sharp developed a politicised relational theory and ethics of care and believed in 
the liberatory potential of the community of philosophical enquiry. Her enlivened sense 
of the community of inquiry emerged through experience of residential work with 
marginalised teenagers, college teaching, her feminist life, and reading of literature and 
the particular philosophers that shaped her thinking. As a person, philosopher and 
educator, she engaged with issues of age, race, gender, class and human damage to the 
environment. Educational and social inequalities were at the heart of her work in 
Philosophy with Children. For Sharp, Philosophy with Children is a way to enact 
equality. There is ongoing discourse within the movement regarding the politics of the 
community of enquiry, and the extent to which, in practice, it lives up to liberatory ideals 
(see for example Chapters 1-4 and Chapter 25 in Gregory, Haynes & Murris, 2017; 
Gregory & Laverty, 2018; Lin & Sequiera, 2017). Keeping these issues alive, particularly 
with regard to age, we agree with a politicised account of ‘facilitation’ in our desire to 
address the persistent postponement of children’s political agency and suggest that 
introducing the notion of affect helps trouble the heavily cognitive (or to use one of 
Haynes’s phrases ‘brains-on-sticks’) approach to Philosophy with Children.  
We return to the question of facilitation, building on the notion of “difficultation” 
(Haynes & Kohan, 2018), to think about how children’s political agency can be respected, 
and reciprocity embraced. Drawing on the work of Toby Rollo (2016, 2020), we ask once 
 
3 Written responses within the collection come from Philosophy for Children scholars around the world 
and, through this collection and led by Maughn Gregory and Megan Laverty, were discussed by a range of 
practitioners, researchers and academics at an international Philosophy for Children (online) seminar on 
26th September, 2020, an event organised by Pat Hannam and Joanna Haynes and part of an ongoing series. 
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more how facilitation might be re-formed in respect of Rollo’s notion of the plurality of 
children as they are, and with all that they bring, rather than to prepare children for a 
future they have not been included in making, for politics-as-it-is, or, as we hasten to add, 
for philosophy-as-it-is.  
For many years now, part of the great draw of the Philosophy with Children 
movement, for us and for many others longing for political equalities, is its declared 
respect for children, its recognition, not only of children’s capacities and tendencies to 
philosophise but the openings for childhood and philosophy of convivial and pluralistic 
philosophising. Writing 20 years ago, Walter Kohan (1999, p.7) already put the 
possibilities of a sustained encounter between philosophy and childhood thus:  
Philosophy for children not only opens the realm of philosophy to 
children – it also produces a clear rupture with the adulto-centrism that 
has dominated philosophy for over twenty-five centuries. For the first 
time, children have frank and open access to the practice of philosophy. 
For the first time, philosophy says to children, “Come, you are welcome 
here, feel at home, there is something we can work out together”. 
The community of enquiry pedagogy and theories of Philosophy with Children 
rest upon a convivial framework for egalitarian, pluralistic epistemic and social relations 
in educational settings (and beyond) and for experiences of democratic living and 
learning. However, as a movement, we continue to struggle and make efforts to realise 
the promise of “frank and open access to the practice of philosophy” and the sense of 
welcome and truly working it out together in and through enquiry. 
The degree to which the community of enquiry is inclusive depends on rights, 
freedoms and relations of power operating in particular contexts and the practical, 
material and social conditions for involvement: these are all entangled. What matters, 
who and what can speak, with what authority and by what means; in which spaces; who 
and what listens; and what is the new that is produced?  
While we hope for equality and inclusivity, silences and absences go unnoticed, 
contributions are misunderstood or undervalued, spaces remain closed (Chetty & Suissa, 
2017; Kizel, 2016; Lin & Sequiera, 2017; Murris, 2013; Reed-Sandoval & Sykes, 2017). This 
is not a matter of merely amending procedures, but of radical attention to blind spots and 
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obstacles; whether located in prejudices and/or unconscious bias; enduring historical 
injustices, institutional discourses; a lack of imagination, spaces or materials. It means 
repeatedly asking, what are the limitations of the process; what are we missing; what else 
might be possible? The ethics of facilitation of Philosophy with Children are bound up in 
the conflicts and turmoil of democratic systems, and their political ideals. They are also 
tangled up in modernity and discourses of educational progress and individual 
development. We are particularly concerned with issues of age, and we argue that, the 
‘working it out together’ necessarily entails resistance, imagination and taking an 
unequivocal stand on the historic exclusion of children and the justification of this 
exclusion on grounds such as insufficient or unreliable capacity to reason, something 
Toby Rollo (2016, p.32) claims is a “remnant of colonial injustice”. Prompted  by Rollo’s 
distinction between moral equality and political equality of children, we examine more 
closely the disciplinary, imaginative and enabling energies of chronological time through 
the concept now/ness in facilitation. Turning to posthuman notions of the body we attend 
to the postponement of equality in Philosophy with Children and get ‘inside the text’ of 
David McKee’s  picturebook Not Now Bernard (1980). By drawing on a Spinozist notion of 
affect and a posthuman reading of the narrative, our enquiry shifts from ethics to ethos, 
taking account of the temporal and spatial dimensions in Philosophy with Children and 
children’s political agency.  
The paper engages with the following questions: 
• How can we think differently about the temporal-spatial order of facilitation in 
Philosophy with Children? 
• What might help to prevent the postponement of children’s equality through the 
here and now of philosophical enquiry?  
 
children’s political equality now 
Rollo (2016) offers a compelling analysis of what he characterises as “false equality” 
(p.33), in spite of shifts in thinking about children’s welfare and rights. He writes that the 
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recognition of moral equality for marginalised people provided a foundation upon which 
political equality could be established, but that children have never been recognised as 
fully equal. He argues that moral equality without political equality is false equality.  
As democratic systems are designed by adults (and the majority of those adults are 
white and male) there are more challenges in including children since, as Rollo says “it is 
not enough [...] to simply add children to adult politics and stir. Something more 
revolutionary is called for” (Rollo, 2016, p.33). Rollo proposes that a decolonial politics of 
childhood is needed, where speech and reason no longer wholly define politics, and 
necessitating a dismantling of ‘established’ authority.  He writes: 
Thus, when it comes to children, the aim is not for those with the requisite 
intelligence to speak for children so as to include them. Nor is it to show 
that children are capable of speaking intelligently for themselves. Rather 
the aim is to reject intelligence as the measure of political worth and 
inclusion. When we fail to do this, we preserve and reinforce the standard 
of speech and reason that gives life to the pernicious colonial logic of 
exclusion and domination. (Rollo, 2016, p.33; italics in original). 
Rollo suggests that taking on such a decolonial politics calls us to think about what 
it means to “respect children as agents on their own terms” (p.33), for children to be 
present rather than “a re-presented interest that has been disappeared into the home and 
the classroom” (p.34).  
We argue that this necessitates challenging discourses of developmentalism that 
flatten and generalise childhoods, no matter where these childhoods are situated. We 
have to be activists and foster equality, and this is undermined whenever we treat 
children as subordinate and deny their agency on the grounds of age or maturity deficit 
(grounds that also intersect with subordination on grounds of race, gender, disability and 
class). When we allow ourselves to be guided by children, and engage in respectfully 
reciprocal relations with them, the agency of children is right under our noses. There is a 
need for hesitation, that which, on ethical grounds, should give us pause for thought. And 
in holding this pause we summon ‘nowness’, to raise further questions about the politics 
of philosophical enquiry, and to echo the urgency of the call for what Rollo calls 
“something more revolutionary”(2016, p.32), when we commit to listening to children, to 
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philosophising with them, and to their political equality. What are we missing in terms of 
children’s political agency, and how can we be more attentive to this in facilitation of 
philosophical enquiry? The ethos of reciprocity is something that needs further attention 
in Philosophy with Children. 
To consider reciprocity, we explore the temporal-spatial order of the community 
of enquiry and invoke the concept of the ‘NOW’ (Hohti, 2015). The NOW signals the 
urgency of political equality for children and refers to the intensities of thinking-with 
children, including in philosophical enquiry. The NOW is momentous, bleeding out 
liberal individualist ideas of bodies as only human, discrete and contained. As Cecilia 
Åsberg and Astrida Neimanis4 put it so well “the notion that one body houses one life, 
that a body is equal to a subject before the law, that bodies might ever be intelligible out 
of the contexts that create them, or that bodies are primarily human, is disintegrating 
before our very eyes”. They argue that posthuman bodies of the NOW ask us to think 
“beyond recognition, derogatory difference and the equality of sameness” (p.13). The 
challenge is to point out again that children are always invisible, even in critiques of 
humanism (Murris, 2021), and to address the urgency of children’s political agency, 
without falling back into discourses that might describe but cannot ‘deliver’ equality. 
The paper works with a posthumanist reconfiguration of facilitation to throw light 
on the performative agency of the clock and the disciplinary and enabling energies of 
chronological time. To do this we return to the picturebook Not Now Bernard (1980), as a 
means to explore the politics of NOW/ness. 
 
philosophy with children and developmentalism 
A popular argument in Philosophy with Children is that the combination of 
education and philosophy is the best preparation for children’s political participation as 
 
4 Shortened version of a talk given at the Visions of the NOW arts & technology festival in Stockholm, 
May 2013. Retrieved from: 
https://www.academia.edu/5869027/Bodies_of_the_NOW_Feminist_Values_in_Posthuman_Times_Cat
alogue_Print_version_short_ 
right under our noses: the postponement of children’s political equality and the NOW 
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 17, fev. 2021, pp. 01- 21                      issn 1984-5987                      8 
citizens, but does this desire not also imply that the child is formed by the adult (culture), 
in order to remedy a lack that child has by ‘nature’? We are concerned about the ethico-
political issues raised by an approach to Philosophy with Children that is developmental, 
and in particular, because of how the ontological dualisms (e.g., Culture/Nature) of 
developmental orientations position child and childhood in facilitation (Murris, 2016). We 
find that Philosophy with Children is often presented as an ‘alternative’ way of thinking 
and being with children, without taking on board its radical challenges to 
developmentalism.  
Grounded in the discipline of developmental psychology, Lena Green (2017) draws 
interesting comparisons between influential 19th century psychologists (Piaget and 
Vygotsky) and Sharp’s and Lipman’s conceptualisation of Philosophy with Children. 
Green argues that, like Lipman, for Piaget child’s individual active engagement “with the 
cognitive challenges presented by the physical and social world” is “the precondition for 
the development of human reasoning” (p.40). Hence, children need lots of experiences 
with such challenges, which include “opportunities to speak and to be respectfully heard” 
(p.40). For thoughts to develop, ideas need to be exchanged. Although this sounds pretty 
straightforward, it is worth hesitating and considering what it is adults are respectfully 
listening to and also how. We look at each aspect of listening in turn. 
Åsberg and Neimanis5 point out the problem humanism poses for the ‘how’ of 
listening NOW and propose a posthuman ethics of entanglement and reciprocal 
becoming that avoids reducing equality to sameness. Who counts as ‘human’ is not only 
a philosophical but also a political and ethical question - not only gendered, but also 
racialised and as Rollo (2018) suggests, intricately entangled with notions of child and 
childhood. Although Åsberg and Neimanis do not refer to child or age as relevant in terms 
of difference, we can see the value of their powerful writing for the NOW of facilitation. 
Developmentalism assumes that the ideal end goal of the normative trajectory of 
maturation and domestication (taming nature) is the adult (fully-human). The less-fully 
 
5 See footnote 2. 
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human (child) develops through a process of recognition (sameness). Being ‘different 
from’ (younger than) simply means being ‘less than’. We see this, for example, when adult 
philosophers recognise the philosophical quality of a dialogue only when children think 
like academic philosophers. If they don’t, they don’t do ‘real’ philosophy (Murris, 2000). 
Secondly, in terms of what we adults tend to listen to in educational settings, it is 
worth re-turning to one of the first texts in Philosophy with Children. Matthew Lipman, 
Ann Sharp and Frederick Oscanyan (1977) explain in much detail that it is not just 
listening to children’s ideas that matters as such, but what is at stake is that adults need 
to take seriously children’s questions that are not discipline specific. Education has 
become so fragmented and specialised, that children (and adults alike) struggle to make 
sense of the connections between the disciplines and how human experience can be 
understood and interpreted (pp.7-8). In that sense, philosophy and children are “natural 
allies” (Lipman et al, 1977, p.7). Philosophical questions about ethics, reality and the 
nature of knowledge centre around concepts that start from people’s own experiences - 
not just learned at school, but in an embodied way, lived through and with. What makes 
philosophical enquiry distinct, is its undisciplining of the way in which concepts tend to 
be understood ‘normally’ speaking, an opening which young children’s questions can 
provoke, and sometimes in ways that surprise or unsettle adults (Haynes, 2008). What we 
have noticed in our pre-service and in-service education practices is that (student) 
teachers tend to ‘translate’ children’s rich philosophical openings into more familiar 
epistemic territory, especially when their interest is of an existential nature (Haynes & 
Murris, 2012). Instead, concepts are like crystals, to be picked up and, as the thinking 
moves in and across disciplines as the enquiry demands (Haynes & Murris, 2019), 
different angles show different perspectives and richer and more varied understandings 
emerge (Lipman et al, 1977, p.9). Importantly, it is this kind of philosophical reasoning 
that develops over time through the experience of enquiring together in a community. 
And it is not easily taught by adults, on the contrary. Lipman et al (p.5) point out that as 
a result of curriculum fragmentation: 
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The indisposition of adults to learn reasoning contrasts so sharply with 
the readiness of children to learn it (along with language) that we must 
face the fact that getting older is in some respects not growth but 
diminishment.  
Such observations influenced the design of the Philosophy for Children 
Programme and the provision of discussion plans and activities to compensate for 
teachers’ lack of confidence and philosophical disposition (Lipman, 1997). The cutting up 
of the curriculum into pieces makes it difficult for adults and children alike, for different 
reasons, to ask or pursue philosophical questions. While young children are regarded as 
‘natural’ philosophers, their early questions require ‘re-instatement,’ in the context of 
schooling and curriculum, to ‘fit in’ and be taken seriously by educators.  
Gareth Matthews (1994, p.16) already argued three decades ago that 
developmental theories demonstrate an inherent “evaluational bias” by assuming that the 
goal of the process of development is maturity, insofar as each stage of the process is 
followed by a ‘better’ and more ‘mature’ stage that is preferable to the last. Moreover, he 
points out, developmentalism is a recapitulation theory: the child’s intellectual 
development is compared with (‘recapitulates’) the development of the species (with the 
child as nature, as the origin of the species’) from ‘savage’ to ‘civilized’. By comparing 
children’s abilities to the adult norm, child - ‘not-yet’ adult, ‘wild’ and of nature (Kennedy, 
2020) - needs taming and domesticating by culture, through adult practices of facilitation, 
remediation, diagnosing and so forth, in order to become fully human (Murris, 2016), 
rather than being already regarded as “already able” (Haynes, 2014). Becoming an adult 
involves bringing children into the experience of chronological time through its 
educational institutions and practices (Murris & Kohan, 2020). For other philosophers of 
childhood, the psycho-social colonisation of childhood demonises, sentimentalises and 
scientifically objectifies child, is ‘ableist’ and ‘childist’ (Rollo, 2020), but also opens up 
conceptually rich possibilities; of reconfiguring child as philosophical (Kennedy & Bahler, 
2017, p.x); of the notion of “child as natural philosopher” (Matthews, 1994) and the 
provocative idea of the philosophical facilitator as “difficultator” (Haynes & Kohan, 2018) 
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This tension is explored by Walter Kohan and David Kennedy (2017) which 
provokes us to think differently about child and childhood and beyond deficit models of 
child development. They acknowledge their indebtedness to Matthew Lipman’s and 
Gareth Matthews’ revolutionary role in establishing philosophy of childhood as a distinct 
field of academic enquiry, but are critical of the developmental view of childhood extant 
in that field, which presupposes a particular concept of time and a reductionist notion of 
potentiality. Drawing on philosophers Agamben, Lyotard and Deleuze, Kohan and 
Kennedy argue that education should not form childhood, but nurture and restore the 
experience of childhood itself - a particularly intensive childlike experience of being-in-
time (Kohan & Kennedy, 2017). As such, the concept shifts from noun to verb (‘childing’): 




The restoration of ‘childing’, (and re-instatement of children’s questions) express 
the embeddedness of reciprocal relations. Reciprocity is a momentous and flowing 
quality of relations, not between discrete individuals, “zipped up bodies”; (Åsberg & 
Neimanis, see footnote 2), but among and between, and including the more-than-human. 
It is a matter of ethos. In this section of the paper we turn more closely to teaching and 
Philosophy with Children. The term ‘facilitation’ is a troublesome concept, adopted with 
the intention to signal a move away from instruction and to elevate the active 
‘participation’ (which body speaks/do all the bodies speak?) of children, to portray the 
teacher as more of a guide and enabler. It feels less directive and neutral whilst working 
as a powerful expression of particular epistemic relations and authorities; of processes of 
enquiry; of places, spaces, texts and things (Haynes & Kohan, 2018). Facilitation is often 
described as managing a ready-made process consisting of a cycle of enquiry steps, caring 
for the community, and as intervening to ensure progress in the enquiry. Facilitation-as-
usual obscures the ways in which teachers’ management of time, (sometimes in the name 
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of fidelity to the process) can act as a disciplining force, one that speaks to the demand for 
‘progress’ in Philosophy with Children, for example, thinking skills need to be developed 
and objectives need to be achieved, within a certain timeframe. We can swing from a 
repressive idea of the teacher to a liberatory one in a perpetual either/or. There are no 
cracks of light in such a dichotomised view. Haynes & Kohan (2018) introduce the term 
“difficultation” to unsettle the sense of ‘easing-always- forwards-in-the-knowing-hands-
of-the-educator’ implied in facilitation. This unsettling is an attempt to decolonise the way 
we understand the relationship between teacher and knowledge. It entails identifying the 
political role of a teacher in enacting certain epistemologies of teaching. A posthuman 
approach involves decentering the human, uncoupling teaching from the teacher, 
opening spaces for nonhuman teaching (Haynes & Kohan, 2017, p.205) and for 
transdisciplinary enquiries.  
Elsewhere we have argued for a move away from locating meaning-making (hence 
facilitation) in one particular (zipped up) human or nonhuman body: either the teacher, 
child or the resource. When arguing for Philosophy with Children as a post-age intra-
generational pedagogy, meaning is created in-between human and more-than-human 
bodies (Haynes & Murris, 2019). The uncertainty and ambiguity of meaning and the 
indeterminate performativity of word and image in picturebooks as philosophical texts is 
intricately linked with the political shift in educator/educated relations that tend to be 
governed by the ‘not-yet’ and deferrals of becoming affected by the NOW (Haynes & 
Murris, 2019). Troubled by not only the adulto-centrism, but also the human-centredness 
of such deferrals, we acknowledge that so-called inanimate objects, such as books and 
chairs (Reynolds, 2019) are also members of the community in Philosophy with Children. 
Indeed, how chronological time and the clock works in Philosophy with Children requires 
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getting inside not now bernard: not now/ness: an ethic of postponement? 








Figure 1 Varieties of Not Nowness 
 
As happens so often in our work, the germ of an idea for this paper grabbed us 
from a picturebook. Not Now Bernard (McKee, 1980) is a provocative picturebook that we 
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have lived and worked with over many years6. And we re-turn to it with the confidence 
that there are always more possibilities: in-between-the-text-and-reading/s, and that, as 
we dive in, something new will emerge. Working with educators and this particular text 
we have been struck by inclinations towards psycho-sociological analysis; for what is or 
is not ‘re-presented’; a tendency to ‘take sides’: of Bernard (neglected child), his parents 
(overworked or lacking skills), the monster (misunderstood and/or angry child). The 
images and sparse text of Not Now Bernard express the absent pre-occupation of the adults, 
the unheardness of Bernard and invisibility of the monster. There is often a desire to draw 
conclusions about the sequence of events and ‘moral message’ of this tale. McKee tells us 
that ‘not now’ came to him whilst he was in the bath, and that the text then produced 
itself. Speaking about the new edition in an article by Donna Ferguson in the Guardian 
newspaper7 , McKee asserts the importance of adults listening to children. He argues that, 
at the very least, they should explain why they cannot listen ‘right now’. Adults’ interests 
often seem to be with the potential of the story for moralising about poor parenting, the 
damage of screen time, or attention seeking behaviour. The comedy of the tale is noted 
but the tragedy understated8. 
When it comes to enquiries through popular tales, and even more when they are 
controversial, or ‘enduring’, many questions are thrown up: how to resist a belief that we 
know what the text is ‘about’? How to sustain the pluralities, become more idiosyncratic 
in philosophising with stories, rather than erasing individual responses, anecdotes and 
knowledges? How to maintain a disposition that allows things to continue to be open and 
interesting? There isn’t only one story. When we talk about ‘getting inside’ the book, it is 
with the knowledge that there is a politics here too. This politics includes the depiction of 
 
6 Murris made direct and playful reference to Not Now Bernard when she wrote Not Now Socrates (1993; 
1994) arguing that philosophy should pay attention to Philosophy with Children. 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/may/10/not-now-bernard-im-on-my-iphone-classic-
childrens-text-reissued-for-digital-era accessed 2nd October, 2020. 
8 In his 1992 review, Matthews writes of the poignant plight of Bernard, the cathartic value in the arousal of 
pity and fear in audiences/readers. He speaks of how a “[d]ark comedy version of catharsis (Aristotle) lets 
children address their feelings of alienation and rejection by laughing at the ridiculous pathos of the 
monster’s situation.” (Matthews, 1992, p.1) 
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a particular home and family (identifiable as western, middle class, white, straight); it 
includes the force of the hammer injuring a finger and green paint puddled on the floor; 
a tray of food set for Bernard (sausages, chips and peas) in front of a television screen; 
green high-heeled shoes; dad’s wristwatch; the designs on the carpets and wallpapers; a 
broadsheet newspaper; the monster’s gorilla like back; robots, cars and construction toys; 
a teddy bear; the presence of anger, pain, curiosity, disinterest; a patchwork blanket; 
comics; a war-like drawing framed on the wall; a ‘domesticated’ inside and ‘wilder’ 
outside, dark and light, colourful plants and shrubs, Bernard being eaten; a monster in a 
child’s bed.  
The year 2020 sees the publication of a 40th anniversary edition of Not Now 
Bernard. The book has been reprinted many times and translated into dozens of 
languages. It seems to have lasting qualities and continues to appeal to the children and 
grandchildren of its earliest readers, and beyond. As to its ‘enduring’ qualities, the 
temporal term ‘classic’ in literature is deeply troublesome with its implications of 
universality, commonality and timelessness. In a short video where he also reads the 
book, McKee’s publisher Klaus Flugge speaks to the trouble the book stirred when it was 
first published, and the complaints he received about Bernard’s unhappy fate.9 Minor 
modifications made by the author to the fortieth anniversary edition indicate that Not Now 
Bernard is ‘of a time’, and that times change. Bernard’s Mum is drawn holding a 
smartphone. McKee suggests that children too, have taken on a ‘not now’ towards adults, 
joining forces with their mobile screens (Ferguson, 2020, Guardian newspaper online).  
Addressing the popularity of the book in his 1992 review for the journal Thinking, 
Gareth Matthews writes that adults report that children seem to like this story and enjoy 
repeated tellings of it, just as it is often reported that (all) children like to eat sweet things. 
Reports suggest that children comment on the monster eating Bernard and on parents 
paying little attention to Bernard. References to experience imply that, having sampled 
 
9https://www.booktrust.org.uk/news-and-features/features/2020/june/not-now-bernard-is-40-
celebrate-with-this-lovely-storytime-video/  accessed 2nd October, 2020. 
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some ‘real life’ children’s responses, adults can come to conclusions about children-in-
general. Reviews of children’s literature are often soaked with these kinds of claims to 
speak, timelessly, on children’s behalf. So what else matters when it comes to repetition 
in stories, or to repeated enjoyment of them? Is the repetition necessarily numbing or 
dangerously comforting? How does the refrain work in this story? What does the ‘not 
now’ do?  
The picturebook itself seems to indicate that, right now, time is a commodity in 
short supply and depicts the isolation of each family member from one another. The father 
and mother appear to be in their worlds of thought and activity, also separated. Dad reads 
the paper and hangs a picture on the wall. Mum paints the walls, waters the plants, puts 
Bernard’s food on the table, takes a glass of milk to his room and lets him know what to 
do according to clock time. There is no life in common to be seen and the present is never 
the right time. Bernard is in a different time, a time of greetings (hello), a time of warnings 
(a monster in the garden), a time of being eaten. Even the monster who has eaten Bernard 
(and replaced him?) is silenced and makes little monstrous impact, settling instead to bed, 
unnoticed. There is no intensity of the now, only a hollow echo of postponement. 
Matthews (1992) suggests that a repeated refrain in a story lends it the character of 
a fable10. For readers, the predictability of the repeated ‘not now’, to everything Bernard 
and the monster say, fossilises the adult/child/other positions of the characters and 
oddly underscores their dis-engagement, whilst making horribly light of it. The repetitive 
mantra of the parental ‘not now’ appears to be the crux of this narrative of 
adult/child/other relations, home, time and (lack of) power - always entangled with 
chronological time, food and eating, always deferring agency. 
Without the ‘not-nowness’, we suggest, however we choose to read the text and 
images, the story of Bernard’s family life indoors and outdoors and his being eaten by a 
monster in the garden, cannot stand up. It rests on this enduring phrase, ‘not now’, one 
 
10 A story intended to instruct or amuse; narration intended to convey some useful truth; often short and 
succinct, sometimes fanciful, often featuring animals. 
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that seems to encapsulate a form of resistance of adults to the immediacy and intensity of 
child, and limitation of child/ren’s initiative. What might come to light when attending 
to such small gestures and utterances with big political consequences?  
 
reciprocity: beyond facilitation of zipped bodies 
A move to ‘difficultating’, rather than ‘facilitating’ philosophical enquiries  
collapses the adult/child binary, and resists a romantic hankering after a non-
instrumentalist engagement with the NOW - a freedom from, for example, human and 
nonhuman curricular constraints: parental pressures, international benchmark tests, 
diaries, calendars, and architectural designs (large windows) exposing teachers as being 
on time, or not (Thompson, 2020). Such a ‘negative’ notion of freedom as constraint is 
based on a notion of hope that is projected into a utopian future forever out of reach, 
based on a past that never was (Barad, 2017). Instead of already assuming Newtonian 
linear time of which the NOW is only a (passing) moment we have troubled this 
chronological notion of time with the picturebook Not Now Bernard (1980) by David 
McKee as our provocation. Placing hope in the present instead, disrupts projections of 
progress in the future and rational calculations of what counts as success. Avoiding grand 
utopian projects, Brian Massumi (2015, p.3) uses the concept ‘affect’ for ‘hope’ and firmly 
locates possibilities for transforming relationalities (e.g. adult/child) in the present. 
Inspired by a Deleuze-Guattarian reading of Spinoza’s notion of affect, he argues how 
human and nonhuman (‘unzipped’) bodies have the capacity to affect and be affected and 
therefore are always open to the world (Massumi, 2015, p. ix). The NOW is a “threshold 
of potential”, existing virtually, not actually, and the intensity of the complex interrelated 
elements in any situation can be felt (p.5). Unlike emotion, or feeling, affect is not personal 
and located inside a zipped person, and freedom is the vaguely sensing of the “virtual co-
presence of potentials” (p.5) - a bodily kind of thinking that is not yet a fully formed 
thought, but more a “movement of thought, or a thinking movement” (p.10). Affects are 
always ethical and political, because they are ways of connecting with other bodies, 
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always situated, but not determined and always uncertain. Moreover, these bodies are 
not discrete, individual bounded units, but fields of forces and movements. So how does 
affect-theory help us encounter the NOW differently in facilitation and why does it 
matter? 
Freedom from power producing binaries, such as adult/child, in facilitation is not 
located in breaking free or escaping, for example, from the curriculum constraints 
mentioned above, but about sensing the potentials and the openness of ‘now/ness’. 
Massumi (2015, p.17) explains his purely pragmatic notion of ethics as what it brings 
about in any given situation - freedom is located in the NOW and not in some utopian 
future: 
All these potentials form such complex interference patterns when three 
fields overlap that a measure of indeterminacy creeps in. It’s not that we 
just don’t have a detailed enough knowledge to predict. Accurate 
prediction is impossible because the indeterminacy is objective. So there’s 
an objective degree of freedom even in the most deterministic system. 
Something in the coming-together of movements, even according to the 
strictest of laws, flips the constraints over into conditions of freedom. It’s 
a relational effect, a complexity effect. Affect is like our human 
gravitational field, and what we call our freedom is its relational flips. You 
can’t really escape the constraints. Nobody can.  
Feminist philosopher and quantum physicist Karen Barad also speaks of complex 
interference patterns as the basic ontological units - not individual entities, but relational 
diffraction patterns (Barad, 2007). Entities come into being through human and more-
than-human relationships. A Spinozist notion of affect is not located in the ‘zipped body’, 
but as a vital force, intensity or energy exists in the interstices of relationality, where 
assembled relations are enabled or constrained from becoming. Affect is an encounter 
with and of the world, and not in the world. As a transcorporeal entanglement, affect 
reminds us that the world is not controlled by intentional human beings (Alaimo, 2010), 
which resonates strongly with picturebook art as provocation for communities of enquiry. 
How resources (often in the field referred to with the unfortunate Behaviourist term of 
‘stimuli’) are adopted in Philosophy with Children  matters in terms of who and what has 
authority (Murris & Haynes, 2020) and agency (Murris, 2020). 
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conclusions - already reciprocal 
Whether human or nonhuman, bodies are not zipped and don’t have fixed 
boundaries. Thus conceptualised and enacted, the notion of reciprocity also changes. 
Barad explains that entanglements are not about intertwining ‘two (or more) 
states/entities/events, but a calling into question of the very nature of twoness, and 
ultimately of one-ness as well. This has methodological implications for working with the 
difference ‘between’ ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘local’ and ‘global’, as well as between concepts 
such as ‘you’ and ‘me’, ‘now’ and ‘then’. Duality, unity, multiplicity, being are undone. 
‘Between’ will never be the same’ (Barad, 2014, p. 178). So how can thinking differently 
about the difference in-between adult and child NOW change our pedagogical practices 
in Philosophy with Children? How can we avoid comparing zipped child and adult 
bodies with one another and open up practices that also include nonhuman bodies? In 
what way can we avoid a reductive move to sameness in our evaluation of what counts 
as ‘real’ philosophy and progress in Philosophy with Children? One possible way is to (at 
least) uncouple intelligence from speech (cf Rollo, 2016; Kennedy, 2020) by introducing 
transmodality in philosophical enquiries that draw on the ‘hundred languages of 
children’ (Murris, 2017). As David Kennedy points out, “[t]he very etymology of 
infantia—in-fans, ‘not speaking’—betrays an implicit automorphism in that it already 
associates childhood with lack, absence, deficit, incapacity.” By introducing ‘other’ means 
of playful knowledge-making and thinking-with materials such as clay, digital 
technology, water, sand, paper and so forth, students of all ages are involved in and 
affected by the movement of thinking or thinking in movement (cf Haynes & Murris, 2020) 
- opening up unrealised potentials in the NOW where freedom is located .  
Performed through a philosophical reading of the picturebook Now Now Bernard, 
and building on Rollo’s articulation of the need for reciprocal relations with children, we 
have argued how a posthuman reconfiguration of reciprocity opens up possibilities for 
(difficultated) facilitation in Philosophy with Children. Through an exploration of the 
temporal-spatial NOW, unzipping zipped human and nonhuman bodies, and making 
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pedagogical suggestions for the inclusion of transmodality in philosophical enquiries, we 
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